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Aristotle and Aristoxenus on Effort
Abstract
The discussions of conatus – force, tendency, effort, and striving – in early modern 
metaphysics have roots in Aristotle’s understanding of life as an internal experience of living 
force. This paper examines the ways that Spinoza’s conatus is consonant with Aristotle on 
effort. By tracking effort from his psychology and ethics to aesthetics, I show there is a 
conatus at the heart of the activity of the ψυχή that involves an intensification of power 
in a way which anticipates many of the central insights of early modern and 20th century 
European philosophy. The first section outlines how Aristotle’s developmental conception 
of the soul as geometrically ordered lays the foundation for his understanding of effort. 
The developmental series of powers of the soul are analogous to the series of shapes in 
mathematics. The second section links the striving of the soul to the gradual acquisition 
of virtues as a directed activity unifying multiplicity. The third examines the paradigm of 
self-awareness that Aristotelian effort involves. In the final section I show how ancient 
Greek theories of music were founded on the experience of striving. The “nature” of music 
is defined by Aristoxenus, and Theophrastus, in relation to the passion and intentionality 
of the soul. The geometrical order, as a synthesis of elements in geometry, music, or 
ethics, is a generative process in which past elements are retained and reintegrated in 
later stages of development. It requires effort to think geometrically, and the progress 
of knowledge itself is an integral aspect of all effort. Effort is the lived and self-aware 
cause which, moving step by step in an orderly and deliberate way, grows and advances 
upon itself. For both Spinoza and Aristotle, effort is the immanent intelligence which 
accomplishes what is in the purview of its understanding. Thus, will, in this conception of 
effort, is not something we already possess innately, but emerges gradually by an effort 
aimed at improvement.
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The discussions of conatus in early modern metaphysics have certain roots in Aristotle – primarily in his psychological sense of continuity, power, and activity. The language of living force, effort, and striving 
are prefigured in Aristotle’s understanding of life, experience, and energeia, 
as an interiority of effort. Aristotle does not have a single term meaning 
striving or effort, but there are several relevant terms that he used: πονεῖν,1 
ἐπιμελείας,2 ἐπιτείνειν,3 συντονίας,4 συντείνειν,5 ὄρεξις,6 ὀρέγεσθαι,7 προσέχειν,8 
σπουδάς,9 and σπουδαῖος.10 Tracking the significance of effort from his 
psychology to ethics and aesthetics, one finds a conatus at the heart of the 
activity of the ψυχή that anticipates many of the insights of early modern and 
20th century continental philosophy from Spinoza11 and Leibniz12 to Bergson’s 
attention to life,13 Heidegger’s care-structure,14 and Deleuze’s intensity.15 I 
will examine effort and intensity in Aristotle’s philosophy and link them to 
Spinoza’s conatus, as an internal principle of causality.
1 Effort. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 5: 1138b27, 8: 1154b8.
2 Effort. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1: 1099b20; care. Aristotle, Art of Rhetoric, 1: 
1370a11. 
3 Intensify. Plato, Republic, 6: 498b; strained, Aristotle, Art of Rhetoric, 1: 1360a 25.
4 Intense exertion. Aristotle, Art of Rhetoric, 1: 1370a13; Aristotle, Politics, 8: 1342a1; 
Problems, 5: 882b1.
5 Contribute, concentrate, converge, intensify. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 9: 1050a23; Aristotle, 
Eudemian Ethics, 1: 1216a33; Aristotle, On Sleeping and Waking, 2: 455a35; Aristotle, Art of 
Rhetoric, 1: 1360b7; Aristotle, Poetics, 4: 1459a26.
6 Appetite, desire, yearning. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 9: 1048a13; Aristotle, De anima 3: 433a7-
434a20; Aristotle, Movement of Animals, 703a5.
7 Strive, yearning, stretch out. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1: 980a, 9: 1048a13; Aristotle, Physics, 
1: 192a20; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10: 1175a16.
8 Attention. Aristotle, Art of Rhetoric, 3: 1415a30; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10: 1175b7.
9 Effort, strain. Aristotle, Art of Rhetoric, 1: 1370a13. 
10 Intensity of character, serious, strenuous, good. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10: 1176a17; 
Aristotle, Categories, 11b17.
11 Baruch Spinoza, A Spinoza Reader: The Ethics and Other Works, trans. Ed Curley (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
12 G. W. Leibniz, G. W. Leibniz’s Monadology: An Edition for Students, trans. Nicholas Rescher 
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991).
13 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: The Modern Library, 
1944).
14 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein Und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996).
15 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994).
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Spinoza understood conatus to be the actual essence of singular things,16 
which adequately describes the individuation of an enduring human life as 
striving to persevere in, and increase, its powers of acting. Spinoza may have 
denied free will as an infinite faculty,17 but he still had a philosophical vision 
based on effort, will, and freedom. Freedom is built up gradually through 
the development of knowledge. One’s freedom, for Spinoza, is acquired by 
a persistent effort striving for the improvement of the understanding. The 
improvement, or emendation, of the intellect is what defines rationality itself 
for Spinoza. The use of reason is therapeutic and intellectually energizing. 
A persistent exercise of reason generates powers and virtues. The adequate 
cause, like an adequate idea, is immanent to conatus itself – striving and 
affirming itself. Particular volitions are directly linked to the understanding, 
so we can only affirm what we understand. We are conscious of our existence 
in the act of striving as the actual essence of our being. Essence and existence 
are united in the internal experience of the adequate idea as a causal act which 
conceives and affirms itself. Furthermore, it is only adequate knowledge 
(active affects) which leads us to happiness. 
Spinoza wondered, if blessedness or true peace of mind were “readily 
found without great effort, how could nearly everyone neglect it?” and 
concludes the Ethics with the famous line which states that “all things 
excellent are as difficult as they are rare.”18 While therapeutic rationality and 
creative intelligence are rare, certain efforts or active ways of striving can in 
fact cause them to come to be. Reason and happiness arise from persevering 
in the work of cultivating habits and virtues. Ethical progress follows the same 
rational structure of the causal matrix of nature and thought (exemplified in 
the geometrical order of the Ethics itself). Rather than being constrained by 
these structures, thought freely affirms their existence in the act of striving, 
as with the effort of a singular volitions.19 
I will show how this developmental sense of conatus (as a cause which, by 
becoming conscious of itself and using reason, improves itself) is consonant 
with Aristotle’s dynamic sense of effort. The first section outlines Aristotle’s 
developmental conception of the soul as geometrically ordered. The second 
links the striving of the soul to the acquisition of virtues. The third examines 
the paradigm of self-awareness that Aristotle’s dynamic-psychical effort 
involves. In the final section I show how ancient Greek theories of music were 
founded on the experience of striving. Aristoxenus’ Elements, while not given 
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in the geometrical order, parallels the fundamental ontological significance 
of striving in Spinozism. The geometrical order, as a synthesis of elements, is 
the same in geometry, music, or ethics: it is a generative process in which past 
elements are preserved and reintegrated. Effort is the lived and self-aware 
cause which, moving step by step in an orderly and deliberate way, grows and 
advances upon itself. 
I. The soul’s activity as geometrically ordered
Aristotle approached the task of defining the soul geometrically. This does 
not mean he approached it statically. Much to the contrary, he approached it 
assuming: (1) The need for a “dynamic” definition, that is to say, the sort of 
definition of a composite which includes matter and form (similar to the sort 
which Archytas gave20).21 (2) That experience is sufficient to account for its 
arising as a principle, i.e. by induction.22 The hylomorphic whole, the ensouled, 
unifies an infinite multiplicity. There is a sort of syllogism, or cognitive 
gathering, irreducible to predication, by which the “life of the soul” acts as a 
dynamic continuity weaving complexity (of movements) and multiplicity (of 
works) into a unity, by a convergence of causal factors. In the geometrical 
progress of the soul, prior elements come together and integrate to engender 
a greater power, complexity, and precision of action. The relation of a triangle 
to a parallelogram is analogous to the power and activity in the works of the 
soul. The work of the soul is a gathering or syllogizing of causal ingredients. 
The first term is the material (multiplicity and potency), the second term is 
the activity (or “essence” τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι).23 The “body having life potentially” 
is a material ingredient, which must be connected to an activity, such as 
digesting, sensing, or moving, in which body and soul form a community and 
continuity. The middle terms are the enactments of the potentials “held” by 
the living body, and it is on the basis of the “work” of distinct forms of life 
that the definitions of different kinds of souls are distinguished.
The definition must “include and display the cause.”24 “Include” translating 
ἐνυπάρχειν, implies that the power must be placed in its proper position in 
the “series” (ἔφεξις) of grounding relations of constitutive properties,25 i.e. 
a relation to prior powers on which the emergence of subsequent abilities 
20 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 8: 1043a22.
21 Aristotle, De anima, 2: 414a15.
22 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 2: 100a10.
23 Ibid., 2: 94a30-38.
24 Aristotle, De anima, 2: 413a13.
25 Ibid., 2: 414b20.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 31/12/2021 12:08:29 |
[ 55 ]
CONATUS • JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY VOLUME 6, ISSUE 2 • 2021
depends (as perception depends on nutrition), and to further powers which 
reintegrate prior activity into a higher order (as thinking depends on, but 
surpasses experience, memory, and perception).26 The inclusion or integration 
of the cause thus refers to the successive emergence of powers, spanning 
from the “body having life” to the activities of a soul that is sensing, growing, 
developing, learning, and acquiring virtues. The soul’s activity and all its 
powers will depend on some particular organized body (involving motion and 
rest). Aristotle insists that “what is ensouled [ἔμψυχον] is made of both [ἐξ 
ἀμφοῖν]” and that “the soul is the actuality [ἐντελέχεια] of some body.”27 This 
formulaic expression of the soul, Aristotle insists, is irreducible to a single 
definition because each of the powers, each different middle term, will form a 
different definition based on its peculiar works.28 This means that we cannot 
merely deduce one from the other – i.e. nutrition, perception, or memory – 
each requires its own treatment and involves its own phenomena that must 
be experienced in its own peculiar works, and with their own particular limits 
and purposes. 
Despite the irreducible diversity of the faculties, they are also intimately 
connected, as Aristotle says: “For always the one-next-in-the-series [ἔφεξις] 
includes the prior-one in potential.”29 Aristotle relates his definition to a 
geometrical one in this conception of a developmental series, i.e. insofar 
as the geometrical demonstrations of a triangle differ from those of the 
quadrilateral. The properties of the triangle need to be demonstrated in 
relation to the triangle itself, and likewise for the quadrilateral. They are 
irreducible one to the other. But the quadrilateral can be understood by 
means of triangles inscribed potentially within it, e.g. in parallelograms. All 
quadrilaterals have eight triangles inscribed in them potentially. But this is 
not the case with the triangle, since it has no quadrilaterals inscribed within 
it. It is prior in series, and simpler. Thus, the series of powers of the soul, 
like figures in mathematics, must be examined both individually and as a 
development through successive parts involving more and more complicated 
compositions which both include and surpass the ones which came before. 
There is a developmental continuum emerging from the most rudimentary 
functions of life such as eating or breathing and rises up through sensory and 
motor powers to memory, thinking, and deliberating.30
26 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1: 980a27-982a3.
27 Aristotle, De anima, 2: 414a17.
28 Ibid., 2: 414b20-35.
29 Ibid., 2: 414b30, (my translation).
30 See Felix Ravaisson, Essai Sur la Métaphysique D’Aristote (A l’imprimerie royale, 1837), 
413-443, 532-540; Veronique Fóti, “Merleau-Ponty’s Vertical Genesis and the Aristotelian 
Powers of the Soul,” in Phenomenology: Japanese and American Perspectives. Contributions to 
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The ensouled continuity of the soul, especially in human life, strives for, 
sustains, and develops many different powers and works. They do not all have 
equal status or the same consequences. Some ground or make possible the 
emergence of others (e.g. memory follows after perception, and language 
follows memory),31 and others are reciprocally transformed by the relation to 
the powers they make possible (e.g. logos retroactively transforms emotions).32 
The events of development temporalize the dynamic continuum as a series of 
sub-ordinate, or prior efforts and activities, rising by an intensification of the 
power of action. The body having life potentially reaches out towards the 
quasi-vegetative form of a new-born baby which gradually develops animal-like 
mobility, perceptivity, and eventually the imagination of a childhood, learning 
to crawl and speak. The powers of life intensify and grow, rising, becoming 
more precise and accurate by building on prior achievements. It is only by 
persevering that experience and thinking later emerge in youth and adulthood. 
Each individual must rise in the generative series of life’s gradual cultivation. 
This growth is akin to the generation of geometrical knowledge. Furthermore, 
as we will see going forward, it is a self-initiated causality which is not only the 
cause of its own mobility, but also of its development and improvement. The 
mind improves itself by its own exercise: “the one who cultivates the mind by 
working it [νοῦν ἐνεργῶν], cares for its improvement [θεραπεύων], and brings it 
into the best condition, seems also to be most dear to the gods […] and it is 
likely this person is the happiest.”33
II. Tendency and effort in ethics
In this section I will examine the role of effort in ethics, outlining how it 
relates to pleasure, attention, and virtue. Effort can be defined in a restricted 
sense as a persistence in acting which involves the awareness that the 
activity is encountering resistance and thus requires attention in order to 
be accomplished. In this sense, it will be painful and fatiguing. But effort 
can have a broader sense, as the living force which is continuously exercised 
attentively and dynamically adjusted by intelligence. In the broader sense, 
effort is synonymous with care and skill. Since work (ἔργον) involves effort, 
energeia (ἐνέργεια) sometimes involves effort as well.
Of the different works that the soul performs well (perception, motricity, 
memory, speech, etc.), some arise spontaneously and with pleasure, while 
Phenomenology, ed. B. C. Hopkins, 39-51 (Dordrecht: Springer, 1991).
31 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1: 980a27-982a3; Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 2:100a3-9.
32 Cf. Rudolf Bernet, and Sarah Allen, Force, Drive, Desire. A Philosophy of Psychoanalysis 
(Chicago, CH: Northwestern University Press, 2020), 43-46.
33 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10: 1179a23-24, (my translation).
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others are toilsome and demand our effort.34 The activities of the soul can 
contribute to sustaining life as well as possibly leading it to its eventual 
flourishing (εὐδαιμονία).35 The growth of happiness emerges from a 
combination of experience, education, virtues, and friendships. Just as we 
must learn the properties of triangles before parallelograms (since the latter’s 
demonstrations make use of triangles), so too, we must gain experience 
before we can have skill or practical wisdom, and we must moderate our 
urges before we can devote ourselves to education. Effort is the immanent 
cause sustaining the progress of each person’s development. 
Pleasure plays an important role in the cultivation of virtues. The 
activities proper to virtue are potent sources of pleasure and the pleasure that 
accompanies them is a contributing factor in the “steadfast” engagement 
and attentiveness in action. Pleasure is not merely something to which 
one’s character disposes them well or badly, as if simply an obstacle on the 
path to virtue. Nor again is it a useless addition which we feel but has no 
causal influence. Pleasure plays a positive role by aiding, sustaining, and 
strengthening the force of striving. Aristotle explains this with an example 
in Nicomachean Ethics 10.5. A musician will find it nearly impossible to pay 
attention to someone talking if there is really enjoyable music playing in 
the background. The reason is that the predisposition of a musician involves 
a tendency, or irresistible attraction, that draws their attention and fixes it 
on the greater source of pleasure. This is not a purely passive infliction, it is 
rather appeals to the musical disposition which already belongs to the soul of 
the listener. The intensity of the pleasure is linked to the activity of the soul. 
The pleasure has an inborn cause which integral to the soul’s being at work. 
Aristotle emphasizes this fact by specifying that the musician is a flute player 
and that what they hear is flute playing. The intensity of pleasure in a musician 
is due to their ability to sympathize with the pleasure of playing the flute 
passionately.36 The musician cannot listen without subtly imitating what they 
hear, and this quickly consumes their attention because there is a pleasure 
amplifying and concentrating the activity. The most intense listening is not 
merely passive but involves an active participation: listening as producing the 
notes again, as if playing along with what one hears.37 
The key is that pleasures have a constructive and concentrating role in 
activities. Aristotle says, pleasure contributes to the completeness of the 
34 Aristotle, Art of Rhetoric, 1: 1370a5-13.
35 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1: 1097b1-20, 1098b19.
36 Ibid., 10: 1175b5.
37 These passages parallel Aristotle, Problems, 19: 919a36, 921a36, examined below.
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activity.38 This completeness is not a static state, but a dynamic condition like 
the prime of life, health, and happiness.39 Pleasure’s influence focalizes activity 
by drawing together a multiplicity of feelings and efforts into a unified striving. 
Intentionality, and practical action generally, involve a concentrating of 
multiplicity into a coherent whole. Aristotle describes the growing intensity of the 
soul as a converging multiplicity of activities and pleasures which are conducive 
to participating in a common ability in a higher order and unity. These pleasures 
contribute to “the growing-together [συναύξουσι] of the activity.”40 Growing-
together implies a mutual augmentation through cooperation. The pleasures 
of music are conducive to intensifying and concentrating the psychical activity 
productive of, and sustaining, the acts of listening and playing.41 Each activity 
has its own particular pleasures which help to focus and amplify that peculiar 
activity.42 We are distracted by the pleasure of an activity when it makes us unable 
to pay attention (προσέχειν)43 to another activity: “the pleasure coming from 
the flute-playing diminishes [φθείρει] the activity of reason [λόγον]” (1175b7). 
The coexistence of the two activities, Aristotle says, leads gradually, by the 
one producing a greater pleasure, to drive out the other until the other activity 
ceases.44 Pleasure sustains the activity by contributing to the intensification 
of effort and attention. Certain activities require higher degrees of effort and 
strain, and the pleasures, for the most part, are proportionate to the degree of 
psychical energy (effort) of the particular act. Intensity of pleasure is proportional 
to the intensity of effort. The pleasure increases the focus of attention which, 
again, increases the effectiveness of action. The unique pleasures of each effort 
are integral to the success of that specific activity. When someone learns music, 
geometry, or architecture, their achievements are partly due to the fact that 
people “make progress [ἐπιδιδόασιν] in the works they enjoy [χαίροντες].”45 The 
enjoyment facilitates the focus and perseverance. 
38 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10: 1175a33.
39 Ibid., 10: 1175a35.
40 Ibid., (my translation).
41 Cf. Aristotle, Politics, 8: 1341a 38.
42 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10: 1175a33.
43 Plato used this word in conjunction with νοῦς; Plato, Republic, 396b, 406d, 407b, 549d, 
as “concentrating attention” or “concentration of the mind [προσέχοντας τὸν νοῦν],” Plato, 
Republic, 432b. Aristotle employs this word on a few important occasions, most notably in 
Art of Rhetoric, 3.14. Προσεκτικόν is the ability to sustain a listener’s attention, something that 
is required in effective speeches. The rhetorician catches the audience attention by an “appeal 
to the listener,” Aristotle, Art of Rhetoric, 3: 1415a30. The speaker draws on, or exploits, the 
attentive capacities of the listener. What they are able to attend to is what they are already 
striving to hear. Aristotle, Art of Rhetoric, 3: 1415b3. 
44 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10: 1175b10.
45 Ibid., 10: 1175a36.
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Virtuous activities involve a sustaining and intensifying of effort which 
progresses by gathering and integrating a multiplicity of contributing factors. 
This amplifying concentration is at work in practical life: the gathering of many 
“means” into a single end (τέλος) characteristic of practical-wisdom (φρόνησις), 
which “make[s] us enact the thing related to the end [τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ποιεῖ 
πράττειν].”46 Even among the virtues themselves there is an intensification 
into higher virtues which depend on the cooperation of them all together in 
a developmental series. The skillful conducting of multiplicity into unity is the 
defining characteristic of phronesis, which itself only describes a heightened 
state of rational intentionality and striving. It is like a funnel that draws into 
itself a multiplicity of habits, experiences, and deliberations of which it makes 
use of to intensify its effectiveness in action.47 It is by the accumulation of 
conducive elements that virtue grows, so much so that “all virtues will have 
already begun together when the one, phronesis, has emerged.”48 Thus, the 
virtue which is responsible for good “conduct” (πράξις), for Aristotle, is the 
one conducting life in such a way that brings all the habits and virtues together 
so they contribute to a common end (τέλος): i.e. doing the right thing at the 
right time in the right way, and paving the way for happiness or flourishing 
(εὐδαιμονία). This is explicit in relation to pleasure as well; “it is not necessary 
for us to inquire what these pleasures are,” he says, “but whether they 
contribute something [συντείνουσί49 τι] at all to happiness or not, and in what 
way they contribute [πῶς συντείνουσι].”50 The pleasures and activities all strive-
together as a symphonic crescendo that harmonizes as one. Furthermore, there 
are pleasures which have an affinity (συνῳκειῶσθαι) with each other, and this 
means that they mutually support and strengthen one another.51 In practical 
deliberation, there is a strain by which the effort of the soul draws together 
a multiplicity into a dynamic whole so that all the different vectors bend and 
converge into the one purpose. “Now no one deliberates about the end – this 
has been assumed (already) by everyone; but about the things that lead [or 
46 Ibid., 10: 1145a6, (my translation).
47 Ibid., 10: 1142a15-20.
48 Ibid., 10: 1145a2, (my translation).
49 The meaning of συντείνει is broadly conduce, draw-together, strain, intensify, contribute, 
and converge. It signifies a concentration of multiplicity. Plato uses τείνω verbs to refer to 
the intensity of human action, such as, “I spoke with too great intensity [ἐντεινάμενος],” Plato, 
Republic, 536c; or, in the analogy between the body and a city, he says that the parts stretch 
out to be integrated by the soul; Plato, Republic, 462c. The members “tend [τείνοντας] to the 
same goal;” 464d. It also has musical connotations, not only the tightening of a string but 
also as a scale stretches from the high notes to the low; Plato, Republic, 432a.
50 Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1: 1216a33.
51 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 10: 1175a29.
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stretch out to τεινόντων] it – whether this or that contributes [συντείνει],”52 i.e. 
contributes to the goal.
The conduct of one who has practical wisdom will draw-in and hold-in-
tension a greater and greater mass of experiences and virtues by concentrating 
all that they developed gradually in education and practice, sustaining this 
potentiality through the process of development towards the goal of happiness. 
This effort brings about a strenuous, serious, or intense moral character 
(σπουδαῖος) (which is the underlying model of excellence which Aristotle assumes 
throughout his ethics).53 Moral action is a matter of tuning the appropriate 
degrees of tension and relaxation of effort (ἐπιτείνειν, ἄνεσιν),54 as well as of 
the pleasures which distract or augment virtuous activity.55 Pleasures, activities, 
and understanding contribute in a confluence of causal factors which grows-
together to produce virtue and happiness. The convergence of factors lends 
itself, above all, to the philosophical or contemplative life,56 increasing the 
soul’s tension and concentration. Effort, in Aristotle’s developmental sense, is a 
growing and evolving energy of the soul, the exercises of which, by persevering, 
are increasingly able to act with precision and effectiveness. 
Progress and development are initiated by effort but are sustained by 
pleasures that gradually increase the facility and ease of action. In the Art 
of Rhetoric 1.11 Aristotle says, “pleasure is a sort of movement of the soul, 
an intensive [ἀθρόαν] and perceptible establishment [κατάστασιν] emerging 
naturally.”57 Aristotle also tells us that “care [ἐπιμελεία], effort [σπουδάς], and 
intense exertion [συντονίας], are painful […] unless people become habituated to 
them; then habit makes them pleasant.” (1370a13, my modification of Reeves 
trans.). In this sense, habit aids the prolonged activity and reduces the pain 
and fatigue of intense exertion. Philosophy requires great efforts which can 
even lend the appearance of a mere toil without progress. In the Protrepticus, 
Aristotle goes so far as to argue that philosophy in fact gradually becomes easy 
(ῥᾳστωνέω), and that, far from being toil, it had progressed in precision more 
than any other art and in less time, despite the fact that no one was getting paid 
for their intense efforts (διαπονήσειαν).58 He explains this by the fact that the 
52 Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 2: 1226b9-13.
53 Ibid., 10: 1177a1-10.
54 Ibid., 6: 1138b23.
55 Ibid., 2: 1106b17-1107a39.
56 Ibid., 10: 1177a11-1178a9.
57 1369b33 (my modification of Reeves translation). This “establishment” is not so much a 
“settling-down […] into a state” as Reeves and Freese render it. It is an active building up, 
raising, and emerging growth of intensity.
58 Aristotle, Protrepticus: A Reconstruction of Aristotle’s Lost Dialogue, trans. D. S. Hutchinson, 
and Monte Ransome Johnson, http://www.protrepticus.info, 24-25; cf. Matthew D. Walker, 
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effort it involves leads to potent pleasures: “the fact that everybody is fond of 
it and wishes to spend their leisure on it, letting everything else go, is no small 
evidence that the close attention [it involves] occurs together with pleasure; for 
no one is willing to work hard for a long time.”59 From this Aristotle concludes 
that philosophy is something of intrinsic value and which we strive for in a way 
that is in accord with our nature, echoing the remarks about the contemplative 
life in Nicomachean Ethics book 10. 
In conclusion, Aristotle presents an ethics of effort. It is by rational and 
moderate efforts that he thought virtue and happiness came about. In the prior 
section I outlined the analogy between syllogistic thinking, hylomorphism, 
and the growth of life. The first premise is material, and the middle term is an 
activity. I intentionally omitted mention of the “conclusion” since life moves 
from middle term to middle term continuously as it develops. The “end,” 
conclusion, or limit of life cannot be a simple termination or completion. The 
“end” of human action is not death, but rather the continuous engagement 
in the activities of the virtuous life and wisdom.60 So too, the “teleology” of 
conatus is not defined entirely in terms of the “goal” towards which it tends 
as a termination of action but denotes the completeness of the effectiveness 
of the operation of unifying and directing multiplicity. The “end” is not where 
living activity stops, but the determinacy by which it sustains itself in action.
III. Life as striving: Intensification, and manifestation
In this section I will detail how life is known in a unique way, i.e. by living first 
hand. Effort is likewise known by being lived, and furthermore, the effort to 
know and the knowledge of effort coincide. Life is a self-expressive tendency, 
for Aristotle, either spontaneously as desire (ὄρεξιν) or by deliberate choice 
(προαίρεσιν).61 The soul is a source of movement and of sentience.62 We feel 
the push of life, both as an interior-force of which we ourselves are the source 
and also in its resulting movements. Aristotle touches on the duplicity of life’s 
vital push in Nicomachean Ethics 9.9 saying that “living in its governing sense 
appears to be perceiving and thinking.”63 Life is an activity whose exercise is 
somehow aware of itself at once actively and passively (effort and feeling). 
“Aristotle, Isocrates, and Philosophical Progress,” History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23, 
no. 1 (2020): 197-224.
59 Aristotle, Protrepticus, 25.
60 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1: 1098b23.
61 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 9: 1048a10.
62 Aristotle, De anima, 2: 413b13; 3: 433a7-435b25.
63 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 9: 1170a20, (Sachs’ translation).
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[I]f one who sees is aware [αἰσθάνεται] that he sees, and one 
who hears that he hears, and one who walks that he walks, and 
similarly in the other cases there is something in us that is aware 
[αἰσθανόμενον] that we are at-work [ἐνεργοῦμεν], so that whenever 
we perceive we are aware that we perceive [αἰσθανώμεθ᾽, ὅτι 
αἰσθανόμεθα] and whenever we think we are aware that we 
think, and if being aware that we are perceiving or thinking is 
being aware that we are [ἐσμέν] (since our being [τὸ εἶναι ἦν] is 
perceiving or thinking), and being aware [αἰσθάνεσθαι] that we 
are alive [ζῇ] is something pleasant in itself […].64 
This awareness of existence and life is not a complete transparency in which 
the self thinks itself as a clear and distinct concept. It is not a static object 
in which we discern a finite set of components. Life’s self-awareness is a 
continuously intensifying tendency undergoing transformations. It is first only 
an obscure urge which we feel by living it. This is what we should see within 
his term wakefulness (ἐγρηγορός), meaning both to awaken-oneself (like the 
middle voice) and to be aroused or stirred (passively).65 Wakefulness implies 
both a vivid awareness of sensation as well as an auto affection of the vivacity 
of motricity (κινητικόν) – as being an interior source of motion.66 Wakefulness 
is the sentience, mobility and self-awareness of an animal, which has its seat 
in the common-sense faculty, as something all the senses share together with 
the motor organs. The common sense, as the ruling sense, is “that to which 
the others converge [πρὸς ὃ συντείνει τἆλλα],”67 which is also that through 
which they all grow in intensity by combining together. They mutually amplify 
each other in experience (connecting sensations, imagination, and memory). 
Awareness is somehow rooted in touch, and touch, for Aristotle, is almost 
synonymous with perception itself.68 And yet, the common sense is not in the 
skin, but we are told it resides in the heart. But it is not really “in” the heart or 
the skin or any single organ, (at least not in the way we now think of mental 
representations as residing in the brain). It is rather an awareness common to the 
64 Ibid., 1170a27-35, (my modification of Sachs’ translation). 
65 For Aristotle’s subtle descriptions of self-awareness, see L. A. Kosman, “Perceiving That 
We Perceive: On the Soul III, 2,” The Philosophical Review 84, no. 4 (1975): 499-519. Cf. P. 
Corkum, “Attention, Perception, and Thought in Aristotle,” Dialogue 49, no. 2 (2010): 199-
222; who gives an admirable interpretation, making active attention a necessary ingredient in 
all awareness. 
66 Aristotle, On Sleeping and Waking, 2: 455a17.
67 Ibid., 2: 455a35, (my translation).
68 See Pascal Massie, “Touching, Thinking, Being: The Sense of Touch in Aristotle’s De anima 
and Its Implications,” Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 17 (2013): 74-101.
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body having life and yet each part still contributes its own peculiar works (hands, 
ears, mouth, etc.). Now, we can’t go into detail here on exactly how this works, 
but what I mean to underline is that the wakefulness of the common sense is 
both active and passive, being both a source of movement, coordination, and a 
convergence of diverse sensations.69 Appetite (ὄρεξις) has its seat in the center 
and is the place where force is concentrated and directed.70 Aristotle says this 
center, as a mediating term between sensation and mobility, is “well-grown 
[εὐφυῶς] to be mobile [κινητικόν] and supply strength [παρέχειν ἰσχύν].”71 The 
inner force of life (ψυχικῆς) is an inborn (σύμφυτον) spirit (πνεῦμα).72 It is the 
nature of this pneuma to be able (δύνασθαι) to expand (αὐξάνεσθαι, ἐκτεινομένη) 
and contract (συναγόμενα, συστέλλεσθαι).73 These movements and tensions are 
the primary works (ἔργα) of the common sense.74 These correspond directly 
with an increase and decrease of forcefulness, an amplification or attenuation 
of effort. Thus, the embodied wakefulness of life is the pneumatic activity which 
intensifies its perceptive and mobile conatus, unifying and directing animal life.
This self-awareness is not exhausted in any particular act, and so self-
consciousness is not something possessed once and for all, nor conceived 
statically. Its truth is lived in a dynamic, embodied, and self-temporalizing 
intentionality of the soul. The auto affections, therefore, involve a diversity of 
vital motions and a plurality of activities. It is, thus, also a hetero affection, since 
it always involves a relational character of each act. This “self-knowledge” is 
not conceptual or propositional. It is, instead, a subtle knowledge that cannot 
be communicated, in the same way that experience generally (ἐμπειρίας), cannot 
be communicated, but must be acquired firsthand. It must be lived by each of us 
in our own efforts to learn and develop. Thus, Aristotle says:
[T]he truth [ἀληθές] in matters of action [πρακτικοῖς] is discerned 
[ἀποδεκτέον] from works [ἔργων] and from life [βίου], since they 
are the determining thing [κύριον] in these matters. Thus, we must 
investigate the things that have been said [concerning happiness 
69 Aristotle, On Sleeping and Waking, 2: 456a7.
70 Aristotle, Movement of Animals, 703a5.
71 Ibid., 703a17, (my modification of Nussbaum’s translation).
72 Ibid., 703a14. See Adriel M. Trott, “Does It Matter? Material Nature and Vital Heat in 
Aristotle’s Biology,” in Contemporary Encounters With Ancient Metaphysics, ed. Abraham 
Jacob Greenstine, and Ryan J. Johnson (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 167-169.
73 Aristotle, Movement of Animals, 703a20-22, 702b23-24; Aristotle, On Sleeping and Waking, 
2: 456a13. This parallels many of the views of early stoics on tension, which they described 
as both effort and pneuma; see A. A. Long, and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 280-286. Cf. Felix Ravaisson, Félix 
Ravaisson: Selected Essays (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 94.
74 Aristotle, Movement of Animals, 703a19.
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and virtue] by bringing them to the test of works and life, and 
we must accept them only if they sing-in-harmony [συνᾳδόντων] 
with these works, while if they are out of tune [διαφωνούντων] 
one ought to consider them mere words [λόγους].75 
Thus, life, soul, awareness, and truth are conceived on the bases of an 
intensification of effort which grows continuously in a developmental process 
of self-improvements (that reintegrates its past achievements to conduct activity 
more and more effectively). Greater degrees of self-awareness arise inductively, 
as experience is gained through carefully and attentive observation across an 
immense multiplicity of moments.76 The cognitive act of the soul which conducts 
multiplicity skillfully must have adequate knowledge of causes. This is the relevant 
sense of reason in life and its works, as a knowledge of the order and connections 
constituting the generation of an informed multiplicity. In the same way that 
certain activities are ends in themselves, undertaken and enjoyed by the same 
effort, so too self-awareness is enacted and perceived in a complex whole. It is 
in this same sense that Spinoza ridiculed those who thought possessing virtues 
deserved recompensed or praise, “as if virtue itself, and the service of God, were 
not happiness itself, and the greatest freedom.”77 Virtue is an end in itself as an 
activity which initiates and gives to itself (intensify) in its activity – both exercises 
and experiences; perseveres and rejoices. 
IV. The expressive effort and intensity of feelings in music
In this section I will further examine the psychology of effort and intensity in 
the aesthetic feelings involved in music. I will draw on, and build off of, the 
above discussion of pleasure, self-awareness, and the intensification of striving. 
I will show that effort provided the basis on which Aristotle and Aristoxenus 
understood the nature of music.
There are many marvelous questions raised about music in the Aristotelian 
collection of texts called the Problems that appeal to the role of effort, 
attention, sympathy, and degrees of intensity. “Why do many people singing 
together preserve the rhythm better than few?”78 “Why do people listen with 
more pleasure to people singing melodies they happen to know beforehand, than 
75 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1179a18-20, (my translation).
76 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1: 980b26-981a23; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 6: 1142a13-32; 
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 2: 99b15-100b15.
77 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p49Schol.
78 Aristotle, Problems, 19: 919a36.
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if they do not know them?”79 The problems examined draw up examples in which 
degrees of intensity of feeling are produced and sustained by active participation 
in music. One proposed answer to the second question suggests that we listen 
with greater pleasure to someone singing a melody we are familiar with because 
we sympathize (συμπαθής) more, due to the fact that we sing-with (συνᾴδει) 
them, and we are told, everyone enjoys singing who is not forced to do it.80 
The feeling of pleasure which arises while listening to music is, thus, identified 
as a participation and a striving – a free or voluntary initiative undertaken and 
felt as an auto affection. This parallels the account from Nicomachean Ethics 
10.4, examined above, in which a flute player’s attention becomes engrossed 
in listening to flute playing. Sympathy, here, involves one’s own effort and the 
degree of attention and participation are proportional to the intensity of pleasure.
This proposed reason, in Problems, is echoed by a principle laid down in 
Theophrastus text on melody. He wrote that “the movement productive of 
melody, which occurs around the soul is exceedingly accurate: when the soul 
wishes to articulate [ἑρμηνεύειν] it with vocal sounds, it directs the sounds […]
and it does so in accordance with what it wishes.”81 The melody is a sign of the 
effort producing it which involves both the want and the success at steering its 
movements accurately.82 Theophrastus tells us that it is, in part, by leaving out the 
notes which, if included, would destroy the melody, that its accuracy is achieved. 
If the intervening notes were heard, the melody would be destroyed by what is not 
in tune.83 Theophrastus rejected the Pythagorean theory that melody arises merely 
from numbers and ratios. Instead, it is due to the selective accuracy of the soul 
“there is only one thing that can be said to be the nature of music: the movement 
of the soul that occurs with a view to release from the evils due to the emotions. 
If it were not this, neither would the nature of music exist.”84 Theophrastus 
therefore posited a psychological rather than a quantitative underlying nature 
to musical expression. The qualitative approach makes effort the fundamental 
element of musical expression. It is impossible to conceive of music, properly 
speaking, which is not an intimate unity of the subject with the object: between 
the effort and its manifestation, the want and the accuracy with which it fulfills it. 
The nature of melody is the growing and dynamic expressivity of the soul which 
79 Ibid., 19: 921a32.
80 Ibid., 19: 921a36.
81 Theophrastus, “Theophrastus on the Nature of Music,” in Theophrastus: Reappraising 
the Sources, trans. C. M. J. Sicking, eds. J. M. van Ophuijsen, and Marlein van Raalte (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 101.
82 Andrew Barker, “Theophrastus and Aristoxenus: Confusions in Musical Metaphysics,” Bulletin 
of the Institute of Classical Studies 47, no. 1 (2004): 101-117. 
83 Theophrastus, “Music,” 105.
84 Ibid., 106.
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acts in an adequate manner (cause) to free itself from spiritual afflictions and 
affections, amplified by the pleasure that accompanies the attentive effort and 
draws joy or consolation from its own free, expressive activity. 
Another of Aristotle’s student, Aristoxenus, also made effort the principle of 
musical expression. He tells us that the comprehension (ξύνεσις) of music is due to 
the activity of sense-perception and memory: 
We must perceive the sound that is coming to be and remember 
that which is past. In no other way can we closely attend to [or keep 
company with], [παρακολουθεῖν] the music.85 
This involves both hearing and thinking, so that “by the former we discern the 
magnitudes of the intervals, by the latter we contemplate the functions of the 
notes.”86 As Staufer explains, “the nature and value of music (for Aristoxenus) 
lie in the conscious perception of its sonorous patterns, not in the sonorities 
themselves.”87 This does not mean that it is purely cerebral or that it leads to 
an analysis or static concept. Music is a prelinguistic cognition. There must be a 
training of the perceptive faculty of judgement itself (common sense) developing 
it to “discern well” (εὖ κρίνειν).88 In this sense, musical knowledge will remain 
tethered to the arts (τῶν τέκνων) as something which we have mastery of, 
(πραγματεύονται), 89 rather than conceptual knowledge.90 This training will, by 
intensifying the activity of the common sense and developing its power, enable 
the soul to perform accurate discernment.91 One who has a mastery of music, 
when they hear a series of notes, will be able to anticipate, to some degree, the 
notes that will follow, because they possess something of the principle of its 
85 Aristoxenus, Harmonika Stoicheia: The Harmonics of Aristoxenus, trans. Henry Stewart 
Macran (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1902), 193, (translation modified).
86 Aristoxenus, Harmonics, 189, (translation modified).
87 Amanda Staufer, “The Unifying Strands: Formalism and Gestalt Theory in the Musical 
Philosophies of Aristoxenus, Descartes, and Meyer,” Musical Offerings 9, no. 1 (2018): 31-41, 
and particularly 35.
88 Aristoxenus, Harmonics, 33.20. I use the paragraph and line numbers for the Greek text when 
I have given my own translation, page numbers when using Macran’s translation.
89 Aristoxenus employed an empirical method of observation to understanding melody, but its 
data is not an external object, but is something that must be enacted and mastered. Thus, he 
calls it a mastery pragmateia (πραγματεία) which implies the concrete activity of doing what is 
known: it is know-how. The primary initiative taken to produce what will be enacted concretely 
with mastery for oneself (πραγματεύεσθαι), (middle voice) one must delimit all the movements 
of voice that singing enacts, i.e. movement in place; Aristoxenus, Harmonics, 3.5-7. Melody is 
something done or performed and likewise the study of music is a mastery of concrete action; 
ibid 1-2.
90 Aristoxenus, Harmonics, 33.21.
91 Ibid., 33.10.
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production: the attitude of the effort which expresses it.
The active attention involved in listening to or making music involves a 
continuity of effort. Insofar as melody is something that is produced gradually 
through a succession of pitches, it is continuous in the same way speech (λέξει) is, 
i.e. by following a natural order and growing the whole from a subordinate series 
of movements following a natural law.92 Aristoxenus explains the peculiar form 
of continuity which defines melodic expression: 
It is not that one needs to pay attention to [intervals] coming to 
be from equal or unequal [magnitudes] in order to understand 
[the source of melodic] continuity, but to [pay attention to] the 
productive-nature [φύσιν] of melody and must attempt [πειρατέον] 
to attentively-observe [κατανοεῖν] and exert oneself enthusiastically 
[προθυμούμενον] to establish [τιθέναι] ‘what follows what’ by natural 
tendency in the vocalized intervals by song.93 
Music comes about by the establishment of consecutive vocalizations, but 
it’s not reducible to the consecutively analyzed notes as if taking each 
discretely and simply comparing it to the others in relation to magnitude or 
number. Instead, the following of each note by another is something which 
involves the continuity of sustained effort, an enduring attitude, and the 
ebbs and flows of consonance-dissonance-resolution or tension-relaxation. 
Again, as with Theophrastus the nature of melody is its productive cause, i.e. 
a psychological initiative, articulation, or mobile intentionality. Aristoxenus 
starts with the act of signing itself as the generative cause from which his 
“elements” develop synthetically; by a training that involves both precision 
in sensitive discernment and intellectual subtlety. The adequate idea will 
not only involve coherent relations among its parts (explainable in rational 
demonstration) but will possess the cause itself from which the effects (songs) 
are produced.94 
Aristoxenus warns that we will miss the fundamental nature of music 
entirely if we reduce it to either vibrations of air or numerical ratios. The 
92 Aristoxenus, Harmonics, 27.27. Speech uses changes of pitch semantically, like raising 
pitch signifies a question, but it does not deliberately hold pitches. Speech fluctuates in pitch 
continuously, and if one holds a pitch, the utterance becomes chanting or singing; Aristoxenus, 
Harmonics, 8.14-10.10.
93 Ibid., 28.20-24. 
94 Here, the elements of Spinoza can be fruitfully compared with that of Aristoxenus. The parts 
must come together and exclude all that prohibits the emergence of the form that wish strives 
to articulate. For Spinoza, blessedness depends on our properly including and prohibiting 
affects. Only what harmonizes with reason contributes to active affects.
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essence of music, its nature, is the continuity of wish and striving. Good 
singing is skillful and the accuracy fulfilling the intent is an obviously sources 
of our enjoyment of an artist’s performance. This is highlighted perhaps in 
difficult passages, we are attracted to and charmed by the skill with which the 
melody and rhythm are articulated. Aristotle questions why singing a quarter 
tone is so difficult and “the difficulty is due to the strain and compression 
of the voice; and there is an effort in these; since they require effort, they 
are more likely to fail.”95 It is the precision of achieving what one strives for 
that marks great performers. Effort need not be taken strictly as the strain to 
act precisely, it encompasses the whole of mental intentionality. Again, the 
pleasure we take in these sentiments is not merely an external stimulation but 
will involve the auto affection by which we feel our own power of acting and 
these sentiments integrate with, and amplify, our attention – the more one’s 
attention is engaged, the more profound the experience becomes. 
This interpretation of music as a dynamic quality of effort was already 
implied in Socrates discussions of modes in Republic, book 3,96 in which Doric 
is said to suggest a stern and tempered character while Lydian is relaxed, 
Mixolydian is excessive and lamenting etc. – all of which are credited to 
the theories of Damon. A mode somehow expresses the intensity, attitude, 
and character of the one articulating it. Aristotle reiterates this in Politics 
8.7, which is mainly in agreement with the Republic, but gives an even more 
nuanced view in which Lydian plays a more prominent role,97 due to its 
healing and cathartic powers.98 A guiding question of the passage is whether 
music should be used only as something merely listened to, or whether it 
must be taught – involving active participation. Aristotle affirms that the 
ability to judge musical performance depends on one having already engaged 
with or even mastered the arts, especially if one is to judge well.99 It is on 
the basis of such effort that we must interpret the three “divisions made in 
some philosophers,”100 which Aristotle professes agreement with: character 
(ἠθικά), concrete deliberate action (πρακτικά), enthusiasm (ἐνθουσιαστικά).101 
We should take them as three tendencies, each of which essentially involves 
a degree of tension in psychical energy. His investigation then moves 
95 Aristotle, Problems, 19: 917b34.
96 On the difference between Theophrastus and Plato, see Sicking “Theophrastus on the Nature 
of Music,” 141.
97 Aristotle, Politics, 8: 1342b23-35.
98 Ibid., 8: 1342a10-17.
99 Ibid., 8: 1340b15-40.
100 Ibid., 8: 1341b34.
101 Ibid., 8: 1341b35.
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between two extremes of the tendencies in music. On the one hand, as a 
deliberate skillful action (πρακτικά), or inspiration and invigoration of spirit, 
(ἐνθουσιαστικάς),102 on the other, a means of relaxation and amusement that 
releases tension,103 and are not strenuous (σπουδαίων).104 The one extreme 
involves work, the other rest, but in both cases, it is a matter of intensity 
or tension of psychical energy. Aristotle observes cleansing (καθαρτικά) and 
healing (ἰατρείας) powers of music, which can relax excessive tensions and 
anxieties.105 This involves an increase in tension giving way to a subsequent 
relaxation: an ecstatic trance like frenzy which, like a purge, releases one from 
psychological/emotional afflictions. Aristotle tells us that the intensity or 
forcefulness (ἰσχυρῶς) of passions in the soul is a source of purification, which 
explains the effects of enthusiasm.106 The listener undergoes a purging of 
violent emotions, which is followed by the pleasure of relief.107 He compares 
this enthusiastic purification to pity and fear.108 In this way, music involves, for 
Aristotle, a developmental series of psychical activities unfolding according 
to a determinate order in which later moments build off and reintegrate the 
prior. 
A related set of questions are raised in Problems 19.27, which helps to make 
sense of this ethical dimension of music. One question raised is, how, “even though 
melody is without words, [does] it nevertheless possesses ethical character[?]”109 
A proposed explanation given is that it (ἔχει) has or bares movements in a way 
different from being moved by a sensible phenomenon.110 Unlike the movements 
of normal sensation, this movement has a likeness to character, and is connected 
to concrete intentional actions (πρακτικαί), which are the signs of character.111 The 
102 Ibid., 8: 1340a13.
103 Ibid., 8: 1342a1.
104 Ibid., 8: 1339b18.
105 This parallel claim of Pythagorean music therapy, Iamblichus, On the Pythagorean Life 15, 
64,1-65,1, in Sorabji, vol. 1, 304. Also Elias, Prolegomena 31, 8-25. “[…] the function of music 
alone is to heal the afflictions of the soul and body. For this reason, philosophy is the ‘greatest 
music,’ because it is healer of the afflictions of the soul, from which it is also called medicine of 
souls.” Quoted from Richard Sorabji, The Philosophy of the Commentators, 200-600 AD: Vol. 
1 Psychology (with Ethics and Religion) (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005), 301-302.
106 Aristotle, Politics, 8: 1342a7.
107 Ibid., 8: 1342a15.
108 Ibid., 8: 1342a7. On the complexity of Aristotle’s treatment of the cathartic powers of 
music, see G. R. F. Ferrari, “Aristotle on Musical Catharsis and the Pleasure of a Good Story,” 
Phronesis 64, no. 2 (2019): 117-171.
109 Aristotle, Problems, 19: 919b27.
110 This parallels Aristotle, Politics, 8: 1430a30.
111 Aristotle, Problems, 19: 919b27-37.
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ethical character of melody is indicative of different dispositions, emotions, and 
attitudes which produce them. These movements make us sympathize with modes 
of thinking, feeling, and acting (the specific qualities of effort). Melody (μελῳδός) 
and song (μέλος) involve a psychical striving which both has and manifests its 
character.112 Listening implies a work of the soul intensifying and concentrating 
attention in participation with the character, attitude, or intention of a concrete 
effort expressing the song. There is a growing intensity in the continuous exercise 
of this striving which progressively increases the richness of its contents. It is not 
the attribute of a subject but the operative auto affection of a concrete conatus. 
The results of these creative efforts are acts of signing or playing a melody. Not 
only is music ethical because it is a sign of the character directing and engendering 
its movements, but also because its suggestive power makes us both imitative 
and sympathetic. Imitation leads to self-initiated action. This was of particular 
interest to Socrates in understanding the influence of musical education as part 
of habit and character development that are conducive to philosophy. One who 
sings in a way which suggests the firm resolve of a courageous yet temperate 
spirit, will, by imitating good character, become ready to be that way deliberately. 
By singing such tunes, one becomes accustomed to strive for the character this 
music suggests. Furthermore, the communal participation of music fosters a 
sympathetic and caring attentiveness to others and our place in the community.
To sum up, the nature of melodic production is explicable only by reference 
to the effort of the soul. A musical performance is a sign of careful attention 
and intentional precision. We sympathize with the striving and imitate it while 
listening closely to the notes they choose. We have a feeling of choice, of wish, 
and of effort – a delicate but deliberate striving that is alert and manifesting its 
marvelous facility and ease at shaping sound and giving continuity to movement. 
The effect of music is not simply a sympathetic feeling that someone is acting 
intentionally (effort in general) but how (concrete effort involving character). 
Again, it’s not merely that the feeling is intense, but the intensity permeates and 
shapes the contents. The striving has a sui generis character that we struggle to 
describe, in the same way that we struggle to describe the difference between the 
taste of blueberries and strawberries. We intuitively know the singular character 
of a melody and can participate with its effort. It is not the attribute of a subject, 
nor the cogito of intellectualism, but the effort, which is not fully transparent to 
itself, but still evident in being lived – a conatus.
V. Conclusion
Aristotle did not simply define life, force, and psychical activity but appealed to 
first-hand experience. He elevated them to primary importance as fundamental 
112 Ibid., 19: 920a5.
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principles. These principles are also not thereby rendered unintelligible but 
ground the very life of experience and our striving for truth. It is with effort that 
the dynamic sense of psychical activity takes on a philosophical primacy. By an 
analogy with what is most immediately evident, i.e. our own immediate sense 
of living, we come to grasp the most fundamental principles of philosophy and 
ethics. Effort, striving, and persevering are not expressed by general concepts, 
definitions, or even clear and distinct ideas. They are nonetheless known 
adequately by being enacted, and since their enactment is the internal cause 
of their existence and development, this knowledge must be active and implies 
mastery. Just as Spinoza’s described the generation of virtue guided by reason, 
so too Aristotelian virtue emerges from a series of dependent conditions and 
Aristoxenian melody passes through movements which are made continuous 
by living effort. It requires effort to think, and the progress of knowledge itself 
is an integral aspect of all effort. Conatus is the immanent intelligence which 
comes to know and to improve itself by acting. Here, the faculty of will and 
understanding coincide and effort itself is cause and self-aware.
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